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Notes
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-COMMENT

ON DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO

TE sTIFY-The district attorney in a murder prosecution, availing himself of a special provision amending the California constitution,' re-

peatedly commented upon the failure of the accused to take the stand
in his own behalf. Defense counsel failed to convince the California
Supreme Court that the defendant had been deprived of any federal
right,2 and appealed the question to the Supreme Court of the
United States. Held, affirmed. The fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution providing, in part, that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" has not
been made applicable to the states by virtue of either the "due
process" or "privileges and immunities" clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. Adamson v. People of California,67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L.
Ed. (Adv.) 1464 (1947).'
Only Georgia retains the common law rule denying the competency of the accused as a witness.4 Most statutes in conferring the
privilege have expressly declared that the failure of the accused to
take advantage of it shall not be construed for or against him.5 Congress has prescribed the same law for the federal courts.6 The California rule which forbids compulsory testimony. but allows infer1. Calif. Const., Art. 1, § 13: ". . . In any criminal case, whether the
defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony
any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the
court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or jury." For limitations placed upon this privilege of comment, see (1946) Note 34 Calif. L. Rev.
764 commenting upon the decision of the California court in the instant case.
2. People v. Adamson, 27 Cal. (2d) 478, 165 P. (2d) 3 (1946).
3. Justices Murphy, Rutledge, Black, and Douglas dissented, with Justice
Frankfurter concurring in the majority opinion. This decision is in accord with
the doctrine announced in Twinning v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14,
53 L. Ed. 97 (1908) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82
L. Ed. 288 (1937) (holding that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment did not apply to the states). Unquestionably, the most significant point in
the case is the storm of controversy centering about the fourteenth amendment
and whether or not by its adoption all the Bill of Rights were made applicable
to the states. However, any such ramifications in the field of constitutional law
are beyond the scope of this note. Attention will be focused only upon the criminal
procedure point decided, i.e. that the district attorney could comment upon the
failure of the accused to testify.
4. II Wigmore, Evidence (3 ed. 1940) 701, § 579.
5. VIII Wigmore, id. at 412, § 2272.
6. 20 Stat. 30 (1878); 28 U. S. C. 632 (1940). Wilson v. United States, 149
U. S. 60, 87 L. Ed. 650, 13 S. Ct. 765 (1893).
[423]

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VII

ences to be drawn in certain instances where the defendant declines
to exercise the privilege is decidedly in the minority.7 But, as noted
by Professor Wigmore, this minority is gradually being enlarged.'
High authorities urge its adoption. Among the foremost are the
American Law Institute9 and the American Bar Association.' ° No
less a scholar than Mr. Justice Cardozo has questioned the policy
underlying the privilege against self-incrimination." One authority
believes that the existence of the privilege accounts for the prevalence
of "third-degree" tactics. 2
An 1886 Louisiana statute" first gave the accused the privilege
of testifying but specifically declared that his failure to exercise it
should not be construed for or against him. This and succeeding
acts have been construed in favor of the defendant by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. The district attorney's allusion, either directly"4 or
indirectly," to the fact that the accused did not testify amounts to
7. The following states allow comment: California, New Jersey, Ohio, Iowa,
and Vermont. In Connecticut the judge may comment, VIII Wigmore, Evidence,
413, § 2272, n. 2.
8. VIII Wigmore, Evidence, 412, § 2272.
9. 9 A. L. I. Proc. 218 (1930).
10. 56 A. B. A. R. 137 (1931).
11. "What is true of jury trials and indictments is true also as the cases
show, of the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination . . . . This too might
be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as in the past there are students
of our penal system who look upon the immunity as a mischief rather than a
benefit, and who would limit its scope, or destroy it altogether. No doubt there
would remain the need to give protection against torture, physical or mental ...
Justice, however, would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to
respond to orderly inquiry, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct.
149, 152, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292 (1937).
12. Irvine, The Third Degree and the Privilege Against Self Incrimination
(1928) 13 Corn. L. Q. 211, 213. For further discussion of the subject of this note:
see Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Accused to Testify (1932) 31 Mich.
L. Rev. 40; Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to
Testify (1933), 31 Mich. L. Rev. 226; Shealy, Comment on Failure of Accused
to Testify (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rev. 361; Taft, The Administration of Criminal
Law (1905) 15 Yale L. J. 1; VIII Wigmore, Evidence, § 2251 (Policy of the
Privilege).
13. La. Act 29 of 1886.
14. State v. Carr, 25 La. Ann. 407 (1873) (This was decided before any
statute was passed); State v. Marceaux, 50 La. Ann. 1137, 24 So. 611 (1898);
State v. Robinson, 112 La. 939, 36 So. 811 (1904); State v. Broughton, 158 La.
1045, 105 So. 59 (1925); State v. Richardson, 175 La. 823, 144, So. 587 (1932).
See note in (1933) 84 A. L. R. 784. In the few cases in which a new trial was
refused it is difficult to believe that the remarks of the district attorney actually
amounted to comment on the failure of the accused to testify: State v. Thompson,
116 La. 829, 41 So. 107 (1906) ; State v. Matthews, 119 La. 665, 44 So. 336 (1907) ;
State v. Varnado, 126 La. 732, 52 So. 1006 (1910). For an excellent discussion
of the pertinent Louisiana statutory law and jurisprudence, see Wright, Comment
and Inference on Accused's Claim of Privilege and against Self-Incrimination in
Louisiana (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 125.
15. State v. Sinigal, 138 La. 469, 70 So. 478, Ann. Cas. 1917D 278n, 280n
(1915).
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incurable error entitling him to a new trial. The enactment immediately preceding the adoption of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure 6 had retained the provision that the defendant's failure to
avail himself of the privilege should not create any presumption
against him. Its present day equivalent, Article 461,17 does not specifically outlaw the drawing of an inference. This omission forms the
basis of the contention that comment should now be permissible
under Louisiana law. 8 Such an argument, however, ignores the
legislative history of Article 461. As submitted by the draftsmen of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 461 did contain a clause
authorizing comment. 9 The legislature struck out this provision
with only three dissenting votes, but did not insert a direct prohibition in its stead.2 °
Any statute sanctioning comment may be met with serious
constitutional objections. According to the Louisiana Constitution,
"no person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself in
criminal cases."'" A similar provision of the South Dakota Constitution has been held sufficient to invalidate an act permitting the
drawing of an inference.22 In an opinion handed down under a
Massachusetts declaratory judgments act, the supreme judicial court
informed the legislature that a proposed statute allowing comment
would be unconstitutional." Later, the Supreme Court of Iowa
refused to consider the reasoning of these decisions, holding that
such a statute did not deprive the defendant of due process of law. 4
16. La. Act 157 of 1916 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1991].
17. "In the trial of all indictments, complaints and other proceedings against
persons charged with the commission of crimes or offenses, a person so charged
shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness."

Art. 461, La. Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928. The corresponding section of
Act 157 of 1916 was the same but added: "And his neglect or refusal to testify
shall not create any presumption against him."
18. Wright, supra note 14, at 134.
19. Ibid.
20. La. S. J. for June 13, 1928, pp. 297, 310; H. J. for June 19, 1928, pp. 544,

545. The defeat of this measure is commented upon by Robert L. Reeder in
(1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 40, 56, and mentioned in State v. Wolfe, 64 S. D. 178,
266 N. W. 116; 104 A. L. R. 464 (1936) invalidating a South Dakota statute

permitting comment. Apparently, the only case directly in point since the
adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure is State v. Richardson, 175 La. 823,

144 So. 587 (1932) in which the court held it was error for the district attorney
to allude to the failure of the defendant to testify. Article 461 was not even
mentioned and only former jurisprudence was cited in support of the decision.
Although the opinion may be weakened somewhat by this fact, it seems very
doubtful in view of the legislative history of Art. 461, that a different result

would or could have been reached had that article been considered.
21. La. Const. of 1921, Art. 1, § 11.

22. State v. Wolfe, 64 S. D. 178, 266 N. W. 116, 104 A. L. R. 464, 478 n (1936).
23. In re The Opinion of the Justices, 800 Mass. 620, 15 N. E. (2d) 662 (1938).
24. State v. Ferguson, 226 Ia. 361, 283 N. W. 917 (1939).
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These cases, while directly opposed in policy and spirit, may be
distinguished upon the basis of the language of the constitutional
provisions involved. Little authority is to be found on this precise
point, for the greater number of state legislatures have not yet
enacted such statutes.2 5 It is clear, however, that the purpose of
these constitutional safeguards was to prevent physical compulsion
and not the drawing of inferences which reasonable men "can no
more disregard than one the light of the sun, when shining with
full blaze on the open eyes."26
Perhaps the most cogent argument for disallowing
comment
is the fact that when the defendant takes the stand he becomes
subject to the laws applicable to other witnesses-including impeachment.2 7 Thus a defendant with several previous convictions,
though desiring to testify, may very plausibly decline to do so. The
possibility of this injustice has been recognized by the Supreme
Court of California and other authorities.28 Abolition of the law
permitting impeachment of the accused by showing prior convictions whenever he takes the stand has been suggested as a possible
solution.29
Should Louisiana desire to change its present rule to permit
comment, such a course would be possible without fear of running
afoul of the Federal Constitution. However, a rule allowing comment would be clearly opposed to the settled doctrines of Louisiana
jurisprudence and a constitutional amendment would probably be
necessary to insure the validity of so sweeping a change.
ROLAND ACHEE

25. See note in 104 A. L. R. 478 (1936). Two earlier cases might be
mentioned. People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522 (1869) is opposed to permitting comment,

but the case did not turn on the constitutional question. In view of the recent
California amendment, supra, note 1, it would be of no authority in California
today. In State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 (1867) it was decided in a Maine constitutional provision that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish evidence
against himself did not deny the jury the right to take into consideration the
fact that he did not offer himself in evidence. However, a Maine statute now
forbids comment. VIII Wigmore, Evidence, 414, § 2272. This is the
Louisiana too. State v. Louviere, 169 La. 109, 124 So. 188 (1929).
26. State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 301 (1871).
27. III Wigmore, Evidence, 380, § 890.

28. People v. Adamson, 27 Cal. (2d) 478, 494, 165 P. (2d)
(1946)

rule in

3, 12 (1946);

34 Calif. L. Rev. 764, at 765; Bruce, supra note 12, at 364; Right of

Prosecuting Attorney to Comment on the Defendant's Failure to Take the
Stand (1936)

29. Id.

22 Corn. L. Q. 892, 395.

